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Abstract
This paper investigates the impacts of capital mobility and tax competition in a setting
with imperfect matching between ﬁrms and workers. The small country always gains and
the large country always loses from tax competition, thus implying tax competition leads to
redistribution from the large to the small country. However, the large country always attains
a higher utility than does the small country. These results imply that our model encapsulates
both the “importance of being small” as well as the “importance of being large”. We also show
that tax harmonization leads to redistribution from the large to the small country.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the last two decades, OECD countries have experienced very high increases in foreign
direct investments (FDI). Reporting the trends of FDI inﬂows and outﬂows as percentage of GDP
across OECD countries from 1981 to 1999, Miyake and Sass (2000) ﬁnd that both were around
0.5 percent in 1981 and rose to 2.5 percent in 1999. This internationalization of production has
increased the real inward FDI position of the average OECD country, measured in constant 1996
purchasing power parities, from $81 billion to $158 billion over the 1990-2000 period (OECD,
2003). In such a context, the existence of diﬀerentials in corporate tax rates is likely to aﬀect
the location of economic activity,whereas empirical evidence conﬁrms that governments vastly use
this instrument to inﬂuence ﬁrms’ locational choices (Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). Building on
that observation, the literature on ﬁscal competition aims at studying how governments choose
their tax rates in a strategic environment, typically by assuming that the productivity of capital
is expressed through a standard neoclassical production function (Wilson, 1999).
Because the outcome of ﬁscal competition crucially depends on the spatial mobility of produc-
tion factors, a relevant approach is to build on the microeconomic underpinnings that explain the
location of ﬁrms and, thus, the international distribution of capital. This is what new economic
geography (NEG) has accomplished by explaining how ﬁrms do interact to form clusters within
a few regions (Fujita et al., 1999; Baldwin et al., 2003). It seems, therefore, natural to revisit
the process of ﬁscal competition by incorporating the main forces uncovered by NEG, namely
increasing returns, market size, and imperfect competition. This is the road taken recently by
Anderson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004), and Ottaviano and van Ypersele
(2005). However, very much like in NEG, all these authors have chosen to stress the role of the
product market. Yet, recent empirical contributions suggest that labor market pooling is one of
the main reasons that explain the existence of ﬁrms’ clusters (Dumais et al., 2002; Rosenthal
and Strange, 2004). The speciﬁcity of human capital being itself the main reason for imperfect
matching between ﬁrms and workers, we ﬁnd it appealing to study how skill mismatch aﬀects the
spatial distribution of ﬁrms through both ﬁrms’ locational choices and the working of local labor
markets (Kim, 1989; Hamilton et al., 2000; Amiti and Pissarides, 2005). When the labor force is
heterogeneous in the skill space, ﬁrms are able to set wages below the marginal productivity of
labor by diﬀerentiating technologies. As a consequence, ﬁrms operate on imperfectly competitive
labor markets. Note, also, that skill mismatch yields increasing returns with respect to the size of
labor pool, thus implying that our approach concurs with NEG (Kim, 1989; Helsley and Strange,
1990).
Assuming that capital markets are perfect and integrated whereas labor markets are imperfect
and local, we study how ﬁscal competition aﬀects ﬁrms’ distribution and consumers’ welfare across
countries of diﬀerent sizes. Because our main focus is on the impact of ﬁscal competition on the
location of ﬁrms, we disregard the possible ineﬃciency of public goods provision and assume that
national governments tax capital to make their residents better oﬀ. As most FDI takes place in
countries with similar technologies and factor endowments (think of the OECD countries), we also
abstract from comparative advantage of both the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin types. However,
although the standard model of ﬁscal competition assumes that competing jurisdictions have the
same size, countries involved in FDI vastly diﬀer in terms of market sizes.1 Size being out of the
reach of harmonization, we thus choose to focus on a setting in which countries are asymmetric
in the size of their capital and labor endowments.
Our main results may be summarized as follows. First, although most ﬁscal competition
1For a general description of asymmetries in standard models of ﬁscal competition, see Peralta and van Ypersele
(2005).
2models are plagued by the nonexistence of a Nash equilibrium, we prove that our tax game has a
unique Nash equilibrium. This in turn allows us to compare the ﬁscal competition outcome to both
the autarchy and no-tax cases. In all conﬁgurations, we show that the large country’s residents
enjoy a higher utility level than do those of the small country, thus implying the “importance of
being large”.2 Though the large country has more ﬁr m st h a nd o e st h es m a l l one, competition
on local labor markets hinders the large country to have a more than proportionate share of
ﬁrms. Furthermore, the few existing studies on asymmetric tax competition predict that the large
country has higher corporate tax rate than does the small one (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991;
Hauﬂer and Wooton, 1999; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005). This prediction does not ﬁtw e l l
the real world, however. For example, Devereux et al. (2002) report the eﬀective corporate tax
rates with respect to several OECD countries. Their Figure 7 reveals that, if the eﬀective average
tax rates in Germany, Japan, and the United States are higher than those set in Austria, Finland
and Sweden, those prevailing in Belgium and in Greece are higher than those in France and in
the United Kingdom. We show that the small country levies higher corporate tax rate than does
the large country. Hence, by focussing on microeconomic underpinnings of ﬁrms’ location, we are
able to identify results that invite us to reconsider the impact of ﬁscal competition.
Finally, our analysis has three major redistributional implications. The ﬁrst one conﬁrms the
existing literature by showing that tax competition distorts the allocation of capital by leading
to redistribution between countries. The next implication is that the small country always gains
and the large country always loses from tax competition, thus implying tax competition leads to
redistribution from the large to the small country. This is due to the fact that the small country
is able to tax its domestic capital but some foreign capital too. However, the large country always
reaches a higher utility level than does the small country. This sharply diﬀers from the result
obtained in the existing studies where the small country typically attains higher utility under
tax competition (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991). Together, these results mean that our model
encapsulates the “importance of being small” as well as the “importance of being large”. The
ﬁnal implication is that tax harmonization does not cause any distortion in the sense that net
global output is maximized, but leads to redistribution from the large to the small country.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. In
section 3, we study the international distribution of capital in the no-tax case, whereas the process
of ﬁscal competition is discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes by discussing extensions and
policy implications.
2 The model and preliminary results
Consider an economy formed by two countries, labeled 1 and 2, and a total mass L of consumers.
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor and one unit of capital. Our modeling strategy
thus abstracts from redistributional issues between capital-owners and workers. Let θ ∈ (0,1)
denote the share of consumers in country 1, which implies that θ also measures that country’s
shares of labor and capital. Let l1 = θL and l2 =( 1− θ)L denote the mass of consumers in
countries 1 and 2, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that l1 ≥ l2. Throughout
this paper, we refer to θ and to (1 − θ) as being the size of countries 1 and 2. Unless explicitly
mentioned, we consider here asymmetric countries with θ > 1/2, thus implying that country 1 (2)
is the large (small) country. Consumers are immobile and can supply labor only in the country
in which they reside, so that labor markets are local. By contrast, consumers are free to supply
capital wherever they want.
2This is reminiscent of Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) who assume that countries have diﬀerent product-
market sizes.
32.1 Local labor markets
The industry is formed by ﬁrms that supply a homogeneous good sold in each country on a
competitive market. This good can be shipped at zero cost between the two countries so that its
price is the same on both markets; we take it as the numéraire. Hence, product market conditions
do not inﬂuence ﬁrms’ locational choices. It is worth stressing that introducing positive trade
costs for the ﬁnal good does not change our main results when these costs are suﬃciently low.3 A
ﬁrm is fully described by the amount of capital it uses as well as by the type of worker it needs.
Let f>0 be the ﬁxed requirement of capital needed to be active on the market, so that the total
number of ﬁrms in the economy is given by N = L/f.E a c hﬁrm has a speciﬁc technology such
that workers can produce only when they perfectly match the ﬁrm’s skill needs. Workers have the
same level of general human capital but heterogeneous skills. Since workers are heterogeneous,
they have diﬀerent matches with a ﬁrm’s job oﬀer. Thus, if ﬁrm k hires a worker whose skill diﬀers
from xk, the worker must get trained and her cost of training to meet the ﬁrm’s skill requirement
is a function of the diﬀerence between the worker’s skill x and the ﬁrm k’s skill requirement xk.
Workers are heterogeneous in the type of work they are best suited for, but there is no ranking
in any sense of these types of work. Workers’ skill types are denoted by x. The characteristics of
a worker relevant to ﬁrms are summarized by her skill. In describing the heterogeneity of workers,
we follow Kim (1989) and Hamilton et al. (2000), among others, by assuming that the skill space
is described by the circumference C of a circle with a length normalized to one. Individuals’ skills
are continuously and uniformly distributed along this circumference; the density is constant in
country i and denoted by li. In this context, the density expresses the size of the local labor
market. There are ni ﬁrms in country i,w i t hn1 + n2 = N. Firms’ job requirements xk are
equally spaced along the circumference C so that 1/ni is the distance between two adjacent ﬁrms
in the skill space.4 The training cost function is β |x − xk|,w h e r eβ expresses the ability of a
worker to learn how to adjust to a technology diﬀerent from her skill. After training, all workers
are identical from the ﬁrm’s viewpoint since their ex post productivity is observable and equal to
1 by convention (thus, there is no moral hazard problem within ﬁrms).
In this paper, we assume that each worker’s skill type is not observable for ﬁrms and ﬁrms
know only the distribution of x (Hamilton et al., 2000). Hence, the training costs are paid by
workers. However, workers know their own types and observe the ﬁrms’ skill needs. In order to
induce the appropriate set of workers to take jobs with the most suitable ﬁrm, workers must pay
at least some part of the training cost. In addition, since the supply of a worker is inelastic, ﬁrms
cannot oﬀer a wage menu so that the worker must pay for all the costs of training, which are not
observable to the ﬁrm (hence resolving the adverse selection problem). Consequently, each ﬁrm
i oﬀers the same wage to all its workers, conditional on the worker having been trained to the
skill xk. Each worker then compares the wage oﬀers of ﬁrms and the required training costs; she
simply chooses to work for the ﬁrm oﬀering the highest wage net of training costs.
Suppose that ﬁrm k is located in country i. Assuming that the skill spaces are identical across
countries, ﬁr m so ne a c hs i d eo fk oﬀer wages wi,k−1 and wi,k+1,t h e nﬁrm k’s labor pool consists
of two subsegments whose outer boundaries are xi,k and xi,k+1.T h ew o r k e ra txi,k receives the
same net wage from ﬁrm k and ﬁrm k − 1, whereas the worker at xi,k+1 receives the same net
wage from ﬁrm k and ﬁrm k +1 . Because ﬁrm k knows the training cost function and all ﬁrms’
skill requirements, it can determine xi,k and xi,k+1 as the solutions to the two equations wi,k −
β |xi,k − xi,k| = wi,k−1 − β |xi,k − xi,k−1| and wi,k − β |xi,k+1 − xi,k| = wi,k+1 − β |xi,k+1 − xi,k+1|.
3This is because the inequalities shown below remain true.
4By analogy with what has been shown on a diﬀerentiated product market, the equidistant conﬁguration of




wi,k−1 − wi,k + β(xi,k + xi,k−1)
2β
xi,k+1 =
wi,k − wi,k+1 + β(xi,k + xi,k+1)
2β
. (1)




li(1 − wi,k)dx − rif
= li(1 − wi,k)(xi,k+1 − xi,k) − rif (2)
where ri is the price of capital and wi,k the wage ﬁrm k pays when it is located in country i.N o t e
that countries have diﬀerent wages because labor is immobile between countries. In the rest of
this section, we suppose that capital is immobile. Hence, the number of ﬁr m si ne a c hc o u n t r yi s
given and each country is in autarky. The amount of capital available in country i being li,t h e
fact that a ﬁrm needs f units of capital to be active implies that the number of ﬁrms in country






where the superscript a stands for the autarky case. This in turn implies that the large country
has a larger number of ﬁrms than does the small (na
1 >n a
2). However, the capital-labor ratio is









because the per capita endowment of capital is the same in the two countries.
2.2 Equilibrium factor prices
We now determine the equilibrium values of wi,k and ri.W eﬁnd the equilibrium wages by taking
the ﬁrst-order condition for πi,k with respect to wi,k:
∂πi,k
∂wi,k
















Thus, the equilibrium wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labor after training, minus a
premium that local ﬁrms are able to levy because workers cannot move costlessly from one ﬁrm
to another. Note that this premium decreases as the number of ﬁrms located in this country rises
because they have less market power.
Substituting w∗







5Note that output per capita in country i is given by
(Z xi,k
xi,k
li [1 − β(xi,k − x)]dx +
Z xi,k+1
xi,k










thus implying the existence of increasing returns with respect to country size.
Expression (7) encapsulates the main forces at work in the present setting. First, when its size
increases, a country becomes more proﬁtable to ﬁrms because a larger labor pool allows them
to hire more workers with a better match and, hence, to produce and sell more. We refer to
that as the labor-market pooling eﬀect. Second, when the number of ﬁrms ni rises, there is more
competition on the labor market, the size of which is ﬁxed because workers are geographically
immobile. This leads ﬁrms to pay higher wages, thus making country i less attractive. We call
this force the labor-market crowding eﬀect.
It remains to describe how the price of capital is determined in each country. Following a
well-established tradition in this strand of literature, we assume that there is free entry in the
industry. Consequently, competition for capital drives proﬁts down to zero, thus implying that ri
must be such that π∗














Hence, in autarky the price of capital is larger in the small country than in the large one.
The (indirect) utility of an individual of skill type x working for ﬁrm k in country i is given
by
Vi,k(x)=w∗
i − β |x − xi,k| + r∗
i














































i ≡ Vi. (10)
In this expression, the second term represents the eﬀect of improving the quality match. When
the number of local ﬁrms rises, the average mismatch decreases, implying that the equilibrium
6wage increases. However, as shown by (7), an increase in the number of ﬁrms also leads to a lower
capital price. Thus, the total impact of the number of ﬁrms on welfare is a priori ambiguous.
From (3), (9) and (10), we have
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Hence, increasing the share of country 1 in the global economy makes the residents of this country
relatively better oﬀ than those of the small country’s residents. The welfare gap between the two
countries thus rises. Moreover, the diﬀerence in welfare is a reﬂection of the presence of increasing
returns in each country since
d2(V a
1 − V a
2 )
dθ2 > 0.
Summarizing the foregoing discussion, we have:
Proposition 1 Consider two countries that have diﬀerent sizes but the same relative endowment
of capital and labor. When capital is immobile, consumers reach a higher utility level in the large
country. Furthermore, the larger the diﬀerence in size, the larger the gap in individual welfare
levels between the two countries.
3 Capital mobility
In this section, we allow for capital mobility so that the number of ﬁrms located in a country is no
longer tied to the amount of local capital. In this process, the labor-market pooling eﬀect has the
nature of an attraction force, whereas the labor-market crowding eﬀect acts as a repulsion force.
The international allocation of capital is thus the outcome of two opposite forces. Throughout
the rest of the paper, we assume that the number of ﬁr m si ss u ﬃciently large to avoid the integer
problem and treat ni as a real number.
3.1 Free market outcome
When capital is mobile between countries, capital ﬂows to the country with higher capital price.















2 i fa n do n l yi fl1 >l 2,w h e r e a sl1 = l2 implies that n∗
1 = n∗
2.
Since the amount of capital in the global economy is ﬁxed, the total number of ﬁr m si ss t i l l










7where the superscript m stands for the case of mobile capital. Using l1 = θL and l2 =( 1− θ)L,









which is a decreasing and concave function of θ over the interval (1/2,1).
When the two countries have diﬀerent sizes, the mobility of capital generates a distribution







Thus, capital is exported from the large country to the small country. This should not come as
a surprise as, under autarky, the price of capital is higher in the latter than in the former. Yet,
the large country still retains a larger number of ﬁrms than the small one: nm
1 >n m
2 . Indeed,
(7) and the equalization of proﬁts between countries implies that the labor-market pooling eﬀect
generated by the large country must be exactly oﬀset by a stronger labor-market crowding eﬀect.
This, in turn, means that the large country hosts a larger number of ﬁrms.
This is not the end of the story, however. Indeed, it is easy to see that the number of ﬁrms


























Hence, when capital is mobile, the large economy accommodates more ﬁrms than the small one,
but it does so less than proportionally. This is because country 1 has a larger labor pool that allows
it to attract more ﬁrms, which pay higher wages. In the process of international capital allocation,
the negative labor-market crowding eﬀect partly oﬀsets the positive labor-market pooling eﬀect
and leads to a more dispersed distribution of capital than in autarky.
Having said that, we now want to know whether our setting exhibits a “home market eﬀect”.
According to Krugman (1980), when the industry is characterized by increasing returns to scale,
the large country would attract a more than proportionate share of ﬁrms. Deﬁne the share of

























because θ > 1−θ, where the equality holds if and only if θ =1 /2. Thus, unless the two countries
have the same size, the large country hosts a less than proportional share of the industry, implying
the existence of a reverse home market eﬀect.5 As shown by (11), this is because the labor-market
5Behrens (2005) presented another possible story that generates a reverse home market eﬀect. He considered
a model having both traded and non-traded goods, and showed that non-traded goods industries may exhibit a
reverse home market eﬀect.
8pooling eﬀect is proportional to the number of ﬁrms whereas the labor-market crowding eﬀect is
proportional to the square of the number of ﬁrms, thus making the large country relatively less
attractive to ﬁrms. Consequently, even though more ﬁrms locate in country 1 than in country 2,
country 1’s share of ﬁrms is smaller than its consumption share.
The above arguments can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 Consider two countries that have diﬀerent sizes but the same relative endowment
of capital and labor. When capital is mobile, the large country has more capital but the small
country imports capital. Furthermore, capital mobility gives rise to a reverse home market eﬀect.
As one country imports capital, countries face diﬀerent incentives to tax capital. We will see
in section 4 how this is reﬂected in the tax outcome.
3.2 The welfare implications of capital mobility
The equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms minimizes total training costs in the global economy. Indeed,















The ﬁrst order condition for the minimization of T with respect to n1 and n2,t a k i n gn1+n2 = N
into account, yields (11). Note that the net output of the global economy is L−T(n1,n 2). Hence,
the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms maximizes the net output of the global economy. Thus,
despite imperfect competition on local labor markets, the international allocation of capital is
globally eﬃcient under free mobility. However, it generates redistributive eﬀects between the two
countries.
To see them, we compare the welfare levels reached in each country at the market outcome
with and without capital mobility. From r1 = r2 and (12), the utility diﬀerence across countries
in the mobile capital case is given by
V m





















because θ > 1/2 (and nm
1 >n m
2 ). Furthermore, the welfare gap rises as the size discrepancy
increases.
Turning to comparisons of welfare under mobility and autarky, standard calculations show
that
V m









































As θ > 1/2 and, hence, l1 >l 2, this implies that
V m
1 − V a
1 > 0.
Hence, the large country always gains from capital mobility. Though intuitive, this result is not
immediate. Indeed, country 1’s residents get higher capital incomes because its price rises when
it can be invested abroad, but they earn lower wages because the number of local ﬁrms is lower.





l2 > 0, it turns out that V m
2 − V a
2 > 0 holds if and only if









This is a second degree inequality that is satisﬁed on the unit interval if and only if θ > θc ≡
(5 +
√
7)/8 > 1/2. Thus, we have:
Proposition 3 Compared to the autarky case, capital mobility always raises the utility level in
the large country. However, the utility level in the small country increases if and only if countries
have very diﬀerent sizes.
When capital is mobile, the global output net of training costs increases and reaches its
maximum at the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms. However, these gains need not beneﬁte a c h
country. When capital is mobile, some ﬁrms move to the small country. Hence, the large country’s
capital income rises but its labor income falls, whereas these two eﬀects go in the opposite direction
in the small country. On the one hand, in the large country, the gains resulting from the higher
price of capital for country 1’s residents always more than compensate their wage decrease. This is
because country 1 hosts more ﬁrms than country 2, thus making the marginal and negative impact
of the labor-market crowding eﬀect weak enough, whereas the marginal and positive impact of the
capital price remains strong enough. On the other hand, consumers in country 2 earn higher wages
under capital mobility than under autarky (see Figure 1). Whether these gains are large enough
to compensate for the lower price of capital now depends on the relative size of the two countries.
As the large country gets bigger, the wage level in the small country goes down, but its decrease
is sharper under autarky than under capital mobility. Consequently, when θ is suﬃciently large,
the gains in wage income may compensate the loss in capital income. By contrast, when country
sizes are similar, such a compensation is not possible. This shows that country size matters for the
welfare implications of capital mobility, in which case capital mobility does not necessarily reduce
international inequalities.
4 Capital taxation
4.1 The tax game
This section considers two local governments that tax local ﬁrms and redistribute the proceeds to
their residents as lump-sum transfers. Let si and ti denote the lump-sum transfer to consumers
and the lump-sum tax on ﬁrms in country i.6 Note that the former may be positive (si > 0)a n d
the latter negative (ti < 0), thus meaning that government i may decide to subsidize ﬁrms and,
therefore, to tax its residents instead of taxing capital.










+ ri + si. (15)
In what follows, we consider a standard two stage game in which local governments, ﬁrst, determine
si and ti simultaneously and, then, ﬁrms enter the market, decide where to locate and pay the
6Because ﬁrms would not operate under negative proﬁts, the nonegativity of proﬁts is here a natural constraint
to satisfy. It yields an upper bound on ti, which is itself bounded above by the highest possible output of country
i,t h a ti s ,αli.
10corresponding wage. From now on, we will refer to the ﬁr s ts t a g eg a m ea st h etax game.T h e
equilibrium concept we adopt is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As usual, the model is
solved by backward induction.
Consider the second stage subgame induced by si and ti (i =1 ,2). The capital price in each




















Hence, ﬁrms’ decisions in the second stage imposes a constraint, given by (17), on the tax game
between countries 1 and 2.
We now consider the tax game. Country i’s government, which fully anticipates the inﬂuence of
its decision on the resulting distribution of ﬁrms determined by (17), maximizes (15) with respect
to si and ti under the budget constraint
sili = tini.























(N − ni)2 − tj. (19)
Thus, the welfare problem of government i is modeled as a game in which this government maxi-
mizes (18) with respect to ti, subject to the constraint (19).








(N − ni)2 + tj =0 .
Totally diﬀerentiating g(ti,n i;tj) for a given tj yields dni/dti.T a k i n gt h et o t a ld i ﬀerential of Vi


















A similar argument holds for country j 6= i.F r o mn1 + n2 = N =( l1 + l2)/f, it follows that
li
f
































11Thus, if a Nash equilibrium of the tax game exists, there is a pair (t∗
1,t ∗
2) such that (i) t∗
i maximizes
Vi(ti,t ∗
j), i,j =1 ,2 and j 6= i and (ii) at the resulting distribution of ﬁrms, both the conditions
n∗
1 + n∗
2 = N and (22) are satisﬁed.
The existence of a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium in tax games is known to be a very
problematic issue. Even in the case of simple games such as those by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986), the existence of a Nash equilibrium has so far been proven only under
special circumstances. Yet, the following result is shown in Appendix A.
Proposition 4 The tax game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Regarding the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms, the following result is shown to hold in Ap-
pendix B.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium number of ﬁrms per capita is larger in the small country than
in the large country. However, the large (small) country has more (less) ﬁrms per capita at the
tax-game outcome than at the no-tax outcome.



















where the superscript g represents the capital mobile case with active local governments. Since































Combining (17) with (20), we obtain
t∗
2 > 0
because θ > 1/2. Moreover, from (23), it follows that 7/8 − l1/(fn
g































We may summarize our results as follows.
Proposition 6 At the tax-game outcome, the government of the small country always taxes ﬁrms.
However, the government of the large country either subsidies or taxes ﬁrms. When it taxes ﬁrms,
its tax level is always lower than the one chosen by the government of the small country.
Because the taxes set by local governments distort the international distribution of capital, the
total output is lower under tax competition. Hence, from the global point of view, tax competition
induces a wasteful redistribution of capital from the small to the large country. Furthermore, the
fact that the small country imports capital allows it to be more aggressive than the large country
in its tax policy.
12The results in the foregoing proposition are to be contrasted to those obtained in models
with imperfect competition in the product market (Hauﬂer and Wooton, 1999; Ottaviano and
van Ypersele, 2005). Hauﬂer and Wooton (1999) considered two countries aiming at attracting
a foreign owned monopoly, whereas Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) assumed two countries
competing for monopolistic competitive ﬁrms. In both cases, the large country appears to be more
attractive to ﬁrms than a small country. Accordingly, the small country oﬀers a lower tax rate
than does the large country in order to counterbalance the comparative advantage of the large
country. In our model, the labor-market pooling eﬀect makes the large country more attractive
for ﬁrms than the small country, but the labor-market crowding eﬀect makes the large country
less attractive than the small country. Because the latter eﬀect dominates the former, the small
country may set higher tax rate than the large country.
4.2 Tax competition versus tax coordination
It remains to compare the welfare level reached in each country at the tax-competition and no-tax
(eﬃcient) outcomes. Consider, ﬁrst, the case of cooperation between governments. Using (18)




(l1V1 + l2V2)=L − T(n1,n 2).
As seen in the previous section, T is minimized in the no-tax case. Hence, cooperation leads to
the same outcome as zero tax rate in both countries.






implying that the large country attains higher utility than does the small country under tax
competition. Derivation of this inequality is given in Appendix C. Moreover, we can see that
V
g
2 − V m
2 > 0.




1 − V m
1 < 0.
Derivation of these inequalities is also given in Appendix C.
Consequently, we have:
Proposition 7 The large country’s residents are always better oﬀ at the no-tax outcome, whereas
the small country’s residents prefer the tax-game outcome.
This shows that countries of diﬀerent sizes have conﬂicting interests regarding tax competition
since ﬁscal competition reduces international inequalities.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of tax harmonization when the two countries set the same tax rate
t on capital. Because (17) is reduced to (11), the distribution of ﬁr m si st h es a m ea st h a ti nt h e
free market outcome. Therefore, there is no distortion in the sense that the net global output is
maximized. However, we can see from (18) that the tax harmonization has some redistributional












It then follows from (23) and (24) that ∆1 < 0 and ∆2 > 0. This implies that, compared with the
free market outcome, tax harmonization leads to income redistribution from the large to the small
country.
135C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have developed a new tax competition model that bears some resemblance with Ottaviano
and van Ypersele (2005). In Ottaviano and van Ypersele, the large country has more ﬁrms per
capita than does the small country both under tax competition and tax cooperation. By contrast,
we have seen that the large country has less ﬁrms per capita in both situations. This is because
we have a reverse home market eﬀect, whereas the home market eﬀect holds in Ottaviano and
van Ypersele. It is hard to believe that such a diﬀerence in results is due to the sole existence of
strategic interactions in our setting. Indeed, as shown by Head et al. (2002), strategic competition
o nt h ep r o d u c tm a r k e td o e sn o ts u ﬃce to invalidate the home market eﬀect. This suggests that,
under imperfect competition, product-market and input-market analyses need not lead to similar
conclusions.
Our approach allows us to uncover a new possible implication of ﬁscal competition. To see it,
consider an economic environment in which not all workers take a job, the setting being otherwise
similar to the one described above. Speciﬁcally, we assume that workers get the same level of
unemployment beneﬁt b>0 when unemployed. This implies that a worker supplies labor provided
that her wage net of training costs is greater than or equal to b. Thisse and Zenou (2000) then
show that the labor market equilibrium involves unemployment in country i when 1 <b+ β/ni
holds, namely when the number of ﬁrms located in this country is suﬃciently small. In this case,
the most distant workers on the skill circle refrain from working, thus implying that each ﬁrm acts
as a monopsony in the labor market. Because ﬁscal competition leads to a reduction in the number
of ﬁrms installed in the small country, it is fairly straightforward to see that the small country
may experience full employment in the no-tax case but unemployment at the taxation outcome.I n
other words, ﬁscal competition may also hurt the small country by generating unemployment.
Three possible extensions, at least, are worth mentioning. First, countries could use the tax
proceeds to subsidize workers’ training. In such a context, training costs would become lower and
wages higher. However, lower training costs would reduce ﬁrms’ market power and would make
the corresponding country less attractive. The following question thus suggests itself: to which
extent does one country subsidy its labor force more than the other, and get a better trained labor
force, according to its size? Second, introducing capital accumulation with the aim of studying
the relationship between economic growth and skill mismatch appears to be a fairly natural topic
to investigate. Last, some empirical evidence suggests that several countries tax discriminate
between local and foreign ﬁrms instead of applying the same tax rate as in this paper (Huizinga
and Nicodème, 2005). It would be interesting to revisit our model when local governments may
use such additional instruments. These topics are left for future investigation.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 4.
1. Existence of a Nash equilibrium in the tax game.
Hereafter, we show that the second-order condition is always satisﬁed at any point for which
both the ﬁrst-order conditions of the two countries (dV1/dt1 =0and dV2/dt2 =0 )a n dt h e
equalization of capital prices (19) hold. This shows that t∗
i is the local best reply of government
i against t∗
j. As will be shown later, such a point exists and is unique, satisfying properties (23),
(24) and (25).


































































































Using (A1) and (A2), d2Vi/dt2


















































































































































































which, combined with (23), implies that
Ψ1 > 0. (A5)

































3 < 0. (A6)
Similarly, (A4) and (23) lead to
Ψ2 > 0. (A7)





so that the second-order condition is satisﬁed for each i =1 ,2.
It remains to consider the following two cases. In the former, a country sets a tax rate
suﬃciently high for all the ﬁrms to be established in the other country. Clearly such a strategy
is not optimal. In the latter, a country gives a suﬃciently high subsidy to attract all ﬁrms. But
then, the other country would reduce its tax rate.
2. Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the tax game.
Substituting n2 = N − n1 into (22), we see that both the left hand side (LHS) and the right
hand side (RHS) of (22) depend on n1. The LHS is negative and increases in n1 in the interval
17(0,8l1/7f),a n di sp o s i t i v ei n(8l1/7f,N]. Moreover, it is readily veriﬁed that limn1→0 LHS = −∞
and LHS|n1=8l1/7f =0 . The RHS is positive in [0,N− 8l2/7f), and is negative and decreasing
in n1 in (N − 8l2/7f,N). We can also see that RHS|n1=N−8l2/7f =0and limn1→N RHS = −∞
(see Figure 2 for an illustration). Because 8l1/7f − [N − 8l2/7f]=N/7 > 0,f r o mF i g u r e2 ,w e
can easily see that there exists a unique point for which both the ﬁrst-order conditions of the two
countries (dV1/dt1 =0and dV2/dt2 =0 ) and the equalization of capital prices (19) hold. Hence,
the proposition holds. Q.E.D.
A p p e n d i xB .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5





































From Figure 2, we can see that N −8l2/(7f) <n
g
1 <N<8l1/(7f). This and n2 = N −n1 imply
that 7/8 − li/(fn
g

















Now assume that γ ≥ 1. This implies that 7/8 − l1/fn
g
1 ≥ 7/8 − l2/fn
g









1/l1,w h i c hi sa
contradiction. Therefore, it must be true that γ < 1. This means 7/8 − l2/fn
g





















































18The proposition then follows from (B4), (B6) and (B7). Q.E.D.
Appendix C. Derivation of Inequalities

















































































































where the second equality follows from (17). Because nm
1 >n m











1 > 0. Moreover, (20) and (24) imply that βl1/(n
g
1)







Substituting (20) into (18), we also have
V
g













































Since (24) gives l2/(fn
g




























As a result, we obtain
V
g














































2 and (24) imply that V
g
2 − V m
2 > 0 if 5β/4 − (βl2/f)(1/n
g
2 +1 /nm




2 and (24) give that 1/f < n
g
2/l2 <n m
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2 > 0.












































Figure 2: Nash equilibrium 
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